Sabotage and global politics

December 9, 2011

TORONTO, ON, Dec. 9, 2011/ Troy Media/ - The Stuxnet computer virus and mysterious explosions at Iranian military facilities understandably give rise to suggestions of American-Israeli sabotage directed against the Iranian nuclear programme. Whatever the truth, it would not be the first time that sabotage has been deployed in global politics. And one of the earlier episodes had a couple of incidental Canadian connections.

When French President Francois Mitterrand and U.S. President Ronald Reagan were attending the July 1981 G7 conference in Ottawa, Mitterrand took Reagan aside to offer access to what French intelligence called the Farewell Dossier. Gathered courtesy of a French-recruited KGB officer named Vladimir Vetrov, Farewell contained voluminous information about an extensive Soviet programme aimed at stealing, or secretly buying, critical American technology. In the words of one American official, the scope of the programme was such that it was as if “the Pentagon had been in an arms race with itself.”

The art of misinformation

So what to do? Rather than simply roll-up the associated espionage network, the Americans opted to treat it as an opportunity. In effect, Farewell provided invaluable insight into the Soviet shopping list. National Security Council operative Gus Weiss summarised the prospect this way: “Now that we know what they want, we can help them get it.”

Of course, what the Soviets were to “get” would be deliberately tainted. This taint took various forms – computer chips designed to fail, defective turbines, and so forth. Among the targets was the natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Europe.

In Reagan’s view, the Soviet Union was essentially a fragile entity. Despite its apparent military might, its inherent inflexibility left it susceptible to sustained economic and technological pressure. And one of the keys to ending the Cold War was to relentlessly apply that pressure.

The pipeline, to be partly financed by Britain and Germany, was a particular bone of contention. Because it would generate significant amounts of hard currency for the Soviets, it would provide some insulation from the pressure. Unable to prevent it, Reagan was at least determined to deny the use of American technology.

However, Farewell offered a more enticing option: Facilitate the theft of the technology, but ensure that what was stolen was fatally flawed. At bottom, it was a supercharged manifestation of the classic technique whereby espionage is “turned” back on the originator.

So, via a Canadian company, it was arranged to have the KGB acquire a “fixed” version of the software required to control the pipeline. Designed to pass normal testing and run successfully for a while, it would subsequently malfunction, creating sufficient pressure to blow the pipeline. And according to revelations made some years later, a “monumental” explosion in the summer of 1982 did just that.

Although the explosion aspect of the Farewell story has been questioned, it’s still relevant to ask whether gambits of this kind are appropriate. To a large extent, the answer depends on what one thinks of the underlying political conflict and the likely outcome of taking action.

For instance, if the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran doesn’t disturb you, then any kind of sabotage would be a source of dismay. Indeed, you might even deem it to be an aggressive act.

But if the prospect does disturb you, sabotage might reasonably seem to be the lesser evil. Surely, if effective, it’s vastly preferable to war or even a pre-emptive strike.

On the edge of an abyss

As for Farewell, the moral conundrum was simpler. After all, one can hardly be blamed for “turning” hostile espionage back on itself. And, for whatever set of reasons, the Cold War did come to a benign end.

Still, it’s necessary to remember how things were perceived 30 years ago. At the time, the conventional wisdom held that we were perpetually on the edge of an abyss, that the doomsday clock was edging closer and closer to midnight. In such a context, the argument could be made that extreme caution was called for and that the actions apparently facilitated by Farewell were correspondingly imprudent. Left alone, things might work out.

Mind you, the novelist V. S. Naipaul had an ominous warning for those inclined to passivity: “The world is what it is; men who are nothing, who allow themselves to become nothing, have no place in it.”

Pat Murphy is a history and economics graduate from University College Dublin, Ireland. He has contributed articles to the National Post, History Ireland, Irish Connections Canada, and Breifne.

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